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Abstract 
In situations of violent group conflict, group members often argue about how to deal 
with the outgroup. While some argue for aggression, force and separation, others 
argue for negotiation and cooperation. Each side attempts to persuade the group that 
their own position is normative and is most in line with the interests and essence of 
the group. These arguments often involve denunciations of opponents as disloyal or 
deviant. In such situations, definitions of group identities and norms, and what counts 
as loyalty and deviance, are therefore disputed. This paper analyses how a UK-based 
Al-Qaeda-supporting organisation denounces ‘moderate’ Muslims in the UK who 
engage with secular institutions and who ally themselves with non-Muslims in 
political disputes. Drawing on theological, historical and political arguments, a 
prescriptive norm is constructed whereby the correct behaviour of Muslims in the 
West is to avoid participation in secular political systems and to avoid political 
cooperation with non-Muslims. Muslims who are seen as breaking these norms are 
denounced and denigrated in a variety of ways by assigning them a range of deviant 
identity positions. Denunciations involve explanatory accounts which construct 
opponents as unworthy representatives of the group based on their deviation from 
Islam, or from ignorance, cowardice, mental weakness or self-interest. This paper 
illustrates that the practice of denunciation is an important aspect of the organisation 
of group conflict. Finally, it argues that it is dangerous for social psychologists to treat 
group norms and protoypes as consensual.  
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In situations of violent group conflict, group members often argue over issues such as 
the definition of group identities, norms, loyalty and deviance. Those arguing for 
separation or violence (‘hawks’) might construct cooperation with the outgroup as 
disloyal and counter-normative. In contrast, those rejecting violence and advocating 
positive contact (‘doves’) might construct violence and disengagement as counter-
normative and deviant. Each side attempts to persuade the group that their own 
position is normative and is most in line with the interests and essence of the group. 
This entails a claim that they are the most authentic representatives of the group, and 
their opponents have no claim to speak as a group member. This paper examines how 
a UK-based Al-Qaeda-supporting organisation characterizes political contact and 
cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK as counter-normative, and 
those Muslims who do advocate cooperation as deviant. It illustrates how a group 
arguing for separation and hostility comments on, denigrates, and discourages other 
Muslims from allying with non-Muslims. Examining how one set of group members 
are denounced and discounted by another set of group members illustrates how 
dangerous it is for social psychologists to treat group norms or prototypicality as 
consensual. 
This paper starts with the assumption that people define groups and identities 
in ways that legitimate their political projects (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins (2005, p563) point out 
in their discussion of leaders as ‘entrepreneurs of identity’: “..leaders are not passive 
onlookers when it comes to identity processes. They actively intervene in creating and 
redefining identities and thereby in creating and transforming their followers.” These 
constructions of identities function to explain situations, organize actions, negotiate 
intergroup relations, and counter alternative definitions (Hopkins, Kahani-Hopkins & 
Reicher, 2006; Hopkins, Reicher & Kahani-Hopkins, 2003). Such issues are often 
matters of dispute between those who are nominally part of the same social group but 
who have different political agendas: members with differing definitions of the 
content of group identity, its values, and the actions it should take to secure the future 
(for an example from Israel see Zemlinskaya, 2008). Studies have shown how, for 
example, politicians and others construct versions of themselves and their views as 
part of the majority or as representing the true values of the group, at the same time as 
positioning their opponents as unrepresentative (e.g. Finlay, 2005; 2007; Leudar, 
Marsland & Nekvapil, 2004; Rapley, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; 2001; 
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Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011; Wood & Finlay, 2007; Yildiz & Verkutyen, 2012). 
For example, Burns and Stevenson (2011) have shown how Irish politicians 
strategically construct and deconstruct the nation in order to explain their own 
electoral success and failure. These politicians accounted for winning a referendum on 
Europe by constructing versions of the nation as having a ‘settled will’ in line with 
their own political position. When the same politicians accounted for losing a similar 
referendum the electorate was characterized as divided or as driven by fear, 
nervousness or malign external influence. In this way the opposition’s claims to 
represent the true voice of the nation on the basis of winning the vote were refuted. 
Research on group schisms has similarly shown how members of each sub-group 
define their own faction as representing the true essence of the group (Sani & Reicher, 
1998; 2000). If we accept that groups can be realms of argument and debate, and that 
they contain struggles for dominance, then this should affect how we conceive of 
basic concepts such as social identity, stereotypes, context, norms and prototypes 
(Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).  
When we examine real situations of group conflict, we find that one way in 
which people argue that their version of the group and its context is correct is through 
denunciations of those with whom they disagree. Although the practice of 
denunciation has been discussed by sociologists (e.g. Garfinkel, 1956; Brinkerhoff & 
Burke, 1980) and historians (for a review see Fiztzpatrick & Gellately, 1996), 
denunciations have received only limited attention in social psychology (although see 
Finlay 2005; 2007; see also Bar Tal, 1997 on the ‘monopolization of patriotism’). To 
denounce is either to ‘accuse publicly’, to ‘condemn’ or to ‘inform against’ (Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, 1990). In practice, to denounce is to claim there is something 
about the other’s identity or behaviour which is offensive or dangerous to the integrity 
of the group. It may involve questioning the other’s loyalty to the state, the 
community or to the ideological programme. In religious sects, for example, 
denunciation may involve highlighting one behaviour or act of ‘questioning’ and then 
generalizing this to other aspects of the accusee’s identity and commitment 
(Brinkerhoff & Burke, 1980).  
According to Fitzpatrick and Gellately (1996), “the practice of denunciation 
exists to some degree in all organized societies” (p759; see also Garfinkel, 1956). 
Institutionalized forms of denunciation are part of law enforcement and other forms of 
social regulation in established democracies, while “police, revolutionary, and 
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theocratic states and communities – as well as twentieth-century totalitarian states – 
have been particularly likely to encourage their citizens or members to write 
denunciations against each other for purposes of maintaining social control, 
ideological purity, virtue, and so on” (Fitzpatrick & Gellately, 1996, p 761). Although 
the phenomenon of individual denunciations made by citizens to the authorities and 
the press has been the subject of historical research (e.g. Bytwerk, 1983; Gellately, 
1990), denunciation can take many forms and can serve many functions (Lucas, 
1996). In situations of group conflict and in authoritarian regimes it is used to 
suppress criticism and dissent, acting both as a form of social sanction and a warning 
to others (e.g. Dittmer, 1977; see also Levine & Moreland, 2002, for a discussion of 
reactions to disloyalty). When political groups or religious sects have internal 
arguments over important political issues, it is used to suggest opponents have strayed 
from the correct path, casting their arguments as unreliable and unrepresentative of 
the group’s values. Denunciation can therefore function as: a public display of norms; 
a sanction to ensure conformity; a display of commitment to the group by the accuser; 
a method of revealing hidden ‘enemies’; and a way of silencing opponents or 
damaging their reputation. Typically it involves explanatory accounts of ignorance, 
selfishness, pathology or malign influence. Just as individuals can be denounced, so 
can sub-groups and unnamed, generalized others. 
Denunciation involves the condemnation of those accused of infringing the 
basic values of the group, and is therefore relevant to understanding social 
psychological issues such as the construction of deviance, prototypicality and group 
norms. When it occurs in situations of group conflict, we also see how hostile and 
violent relations between groups can be sustained through intra-group social practices. 
This paper takes the position that to understand social life it is important to examine 
the social practices of which it is made up. In this respect it shares the concerns of 
discourse analysts, conversation analysts, and other social psychologists who draw on 
social/political sciences and historical research. This is not to claim that the study of 
beliefs, attitudes and emotions is unimportant, just that we need to do both. The study 
of real-life situations is a crucial counter to research which breaks variables into 
separate units and studies them in controlled contexts, because it allows us to see how 
intertwined such variables and processes can be outside the laboratory.  
Since denunciation involves an accusation that another person or group has 
committed an offence, it involves the specification of a prescriptive norm which has 
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been violated, as well as the construction of a ‘good’ versus a ‘bad’ member of the 
group. This is relevant to understandings of the ‘black sheep effect’ (Marques, 
Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988) and disloyalty/defection in 
groups (Levine & Moreland, 2002; Mannetti et al, 2010). Studies of the ‘black sheep 
effect’ suggest that, in particular circumstances, an ‘unlikeable’, ‘unfavourable’, 
‘deviant’ or ‘nonprototypical’ ingroup member is judged less favourably than a 
comparable outgroup member. These experimental studies create a pre-determined 
non-prototypical (or counter-normative) target in a range of ways: by describing poor 
performance (e.g. Lewis & Sherman, 2010; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988); unfavourable 
character descriptions (e.g. Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992; Marques et al, 1988); 
disloyalty (Branscombe, Wann, Noel & Coleman, 1993); lack of stereotypical traits 
(e.g. Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 2000; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001); non-
modal behaviours (Marques, Abrams, Paez & Martinez-Taboada, 1998); or beliefs 
(e.g. Abrams et al, 2000; Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Pinto, Marques, Levine & 
Abrams, 2010; Scheepers, Branscombe, Spears & Doosje, 2002). Such studies are 
useful, but understanding norms and deviance in real-life situations of political 
turmoil requires us to take a step further and accept that what counts as a normative 
behaviour or belief can be a political judgement rather than a fact. In political 
disputes, norms are constructed by group members to argue that their agenda is 
correct (and vice-versa), and their in-group opponents are wrong. If norms are 
disputed, then what counts as ‘disloyalty’ and ‘defection’ can also be a contested 
issue. 
In intergroup situations involving conflict, one important set of prescriptive 
norms concern group contact and attitudes towards the outgroup. In situations of 
sectarian conflict, racial segregation or inequality, we might find norms and sanctions 
which discourage contact with other groups (Allport, 1954/8; Pettigrew, 1998; for 
examples see Connolly, 2000; Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 
2006) and accusations of disloyalty directed at those who engage in such contact 
(Finlay, 2005, 2007). We also find members of groups argue over these norms. 
Examples of such arguments include those between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ during war, 
between opponents and proponents of racial and caste segregation, and between those 
for and against inter-ethnic marriage in multicultural societies.  
Arguments over contact norms are found  among Muslims with different 
political, theological and cultural backgrounds and projects (Hopkins & Kahani-
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Hopkins, 2006). Muslims are a heterogeneous social group. According to Jackson 
(2007) the category includes ‘over a billion people from more than 50 countries, 
languages and cultures, five major doctrinal groupings and hundreds of smaller sects, 
theological traditions and cultural-religious variants’ (p413; see also Esposito, 1991). 
The variation provides for a range of differing practices, rules for living as well as 
widespread debate over the meaning or application of Quranic verses (Hopkins & 
Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Malik, 2006; Peters, 1996). For example, Roy (2005) 
describes the differing interpretations of Islam from fundamentalist as opposed to 
liberal, reformist or more generally moderate Muslim theologians and thinkers. In the 
UK, there is much debate among Muslims over what a Muslim identity involves, what 
the correct actions and political positions for Muslims in multicultural societies are, 
and how Muslims should interact with non-Muslims (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 
2002; Hopkins et al, 2003). For example, Hopkins and Kahani-Holkins (2004a; 2006) 
illustrate how the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain argued that the west was hostile 
to Islam and urged UK Muslims to develop autonomous political organisations, 
identifying with the global ‘ummah’ rather than the nation state. Other organisations 
such as the Muslim Council of Britain argued for greater participation with the 
political system (see also Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Yildiz & Verkuyten, 
2012) and many UK Muslims report valuing having dual identities as both British and 
Muslim (Hopkins, 2011). Both sides argue that their position is correct and normative 
for the group. 
The data I present here consist of emails sent out by a UK Al-Qaeda-supporting 
group (for discussion of the difficulties of terms such as ‘extremist’, ‘jihadist’, 
‘islamist’ see Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Jenkins, 2007). The communications 
use the category ‘moderate’ in a pejorative sense and question the use of the term 
‘extremist’ and ‘fundamentalist’, declaring that this term is used to silence Muslims 
with a political orientation or who speak with a ‘true’ understanding of Islam (see 
Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009 for debates on this issue). The analysis will first 
examine the construction of prescriptive norms against political contact and 
cooperation with non-Muslims. It will then illustrate how denunciations and particular 
explanatory accounts are used to present fellow Muslims who engage in such contact 






The data set consists of a collection of e-mails from an organisation called the Party 
for Islamic Renewal (PIR), which is linked to the Tajdeed.net web-site. Tajdeed is 
Arabic for Renewal. The PIR was formerly known as the Committee for the Defence 
of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). The PIR and Tajdeed web-site were run by the Saudi 
dissident Mohammed al-Masari (also spelt al-Massari). The Tajdeed web-site, often 
described in the press as a ‘jihadi’ site, was reported as posting video messages from 
Ayman al-Zawahiri (the Al Qaeda second-in-command in 2005 and leader in 2011), 
an online terror training manual, and videos of beheadings and suicide bombings 
(Times & Guardian, 2005). One of the al-Zawahiri videos posted on the Tajdeed site 
was reported as providing a justification for the London bombings of 2005 (Sunday 
Times, 2005). In July 2005, the Daily Telegraph claimed that al-Masari ‘is considered 
by Islamist experts to be a key influence on young jihadists in Britain.’ In the same 
year, there were widespread reports in the press that al-Masari and the Tajdeed site 
were on a list that MI5 had drawn up of ‘Islamist militants’ to be deported and web-
sites to be shut down under new anti-terrorism laws. Although the deportation of al-
Masari failed due to conflicts with the Human Rights Act, in August of 2005 he 
suspended the web-site, and in October the PIR mailings abruptly stopped. At the time 
of writing (2012) the PIR had a Facebook page which links to the Arabic-language 
Tajdeed site, which was running again. 
 
Data-Set 
The articles analysed come from a series of 146 e-mails sent out between 11/4/2005 
and 2/10/2005 from the sender ‘Party for Islamic Renewal’1 to its mailing list. Each 
email contained a link to the Tajdeed web-site as part of the ‘signature’, and many 
emails contained the following disclaimer: ‘This mailing list strives to educate the 
general public and inform it about interesting news, issues worthy of reflection or 
even points of view worthy of condemnation and rejection. Therefore the content of 
the topics published here should not be regarded as representing PIR's point of view, 
                                                 
1 These emails were sent directly to my university email account by the organisation after I came to be 
on their mailing list. I did not request to receive their emails, nor had I heard of them before receiving 
the first message. It is possible my email address was gleaned from previous papers, from online 
discussions of these papers, or from an online petition. A university ethics panel indicated there were 
no ethical concerns in analysing and publishing this data. 
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neither in full nor in part. Please adopt, print, translate in various languages and 
distribute widely!!’ 
The emails were all written in English and came in two forms:  110 emails 
containing single articles or messages (12 were blank or consisted of nonsense 
characters, leaving 98 for analysis), and 36 emails containing the Al-Hillal newsletter. 
Typically the emails had themes that I would describe as anti-Western; against the 
established rulers of Muslim countries; and against Western involvement in Muslim 
countries. Emails expressing direct support for Al Qaeda carried titles such as ‘Why 
the world loves Usamah and not Bush’, ‘Inside the mind of the suicide bomber’, and 
‘Shock and awe in London.’  
The analysis in this paper is based on the 98 emails consisting of single articles 
or messages. These emails were mostly polemics written by single authors, or articles 
copied from newspapers or other web-sites. They also included calls to sign petitions 
and attend demonstrations, a fatwa (on not voting), and statements by organisations 
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and the PIR. The media articles came from a range of sources 
such as the BBC, The Independent, The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The New Statesman, 
the LA Times and the Daily Star. The essays were often reproduced on other sites 
such as Media Monitors, The Official Clearing House, the Institute of Historical 
Review, Yahoo Discussion Groups, and ummah.com. It was often unclear where the 
articles were first posted. Two regular writers dominated the polemical pieces, 
although a number of other writers were also featured on more than one occasion.  
The emails represent a running commentary on current affairs over the course of 
almost six months in 2005, a period of political turmoil which included the ongoing 
Iraq war, reports of the desecration of the Quran and mistreatment of prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay, the UK general elections, the London bombings of July 7th, 2005, 
and the subsequent government actions to draft new anti-terrorism legislation.  
 
Analytic Approach 
Although the analysis shares the view of critical discursive approaches that writers 
and speakers ‘draw on cultural resources that have a history, and the repetition of 
these resources has important social consequences that we need to study’ (Wetherell, 
2003, p26), this paper uses thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This approach 
was chosen because the goal of the paper is to provide a broad overview of 1) the 
construction of prescriptive social norms (in particular norms against political 
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cooperation and contact) and 2) the denunciation of ‘moderates’ who break these 
norms. The aim was to identify broad themes used to construct the commentators’ 
political positions as correct and those of other Muslims as incorrect, and to examine 
how social identities and psychological explanations feature in these constructions. 
Although much could be gained from a discursive analysis, the level of detail required 
would only have permitted a small number of quotes to be analysed, and would 
therefore not have allowed such a broad sweep. Although attention is paid to the 
cultural resources drawn on in these constructions (for example the notion of ‘kufr’), 
less attention is therefore given to a detailed consideration of more local aspects of 
context.  
All emails that mentioned the issue of political contact with, or influence by, 
non-Muslims, or participation in secular political processes, were identified and the 
specific context of this contact was noted. Thematic analysis focused on 1) reasons 
offered for why such contact was to be avoided (i.e. arguments supporting norms of 
political separation and non-contact), and 2) the ways in which Muslims engaging in 
such contact were denounced and constructed as deviant through the use of labels, 
slurs and explanatory accounts. The former are presented in the first half of the 
Analysis section. The latter are described in the second half of the Analysis section. 
 
Analysis 
The analysis focuses on mailings which refer to situations of political contact, 
cooperation or political agreement between Muslims and non-Muslims. There were 35 
such mailings, written by 12 individuals/organisations. The two regular PIR writers 
authored 22 (commentator A = 13; commentator B = 9), with commentators C and D 
authoring 3 and 2 respectively. Other authors featured once each. Muslims engaged in 
political contact were described in derogatory terms in all. The Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB - an umbrella organization of several hundred Muslim organizations) 
was a particular target in this respect. In 2005 the MCB was widely seen to represent 
the UK Muslim community, participated in a government taskforce on extremism, 
criticized terrorist attacks, and its leader, Sir Iqbal Sacranie, received a knighthood. 
A second set of targets included Muslims participating in UK politics during the 
general election of 2005, particularly those who supported the newly-formed Respect 
Party and its leader George Galloway. Galloway, an ex-Labour Party Member of 
Parliament, was known for his criticism of the Iraq War and his support for the 
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Palestinians. The Respect party targeted constituencies with large Muslim 
populations, and many of its leading members were Muslims. The leaders of Muslim 
countries and Muslims calling for the reform of Islam were also denounced for being 
too influenced by the West. Mailings often called for Muslims in the UK to build 
stronger ties with their ‘own community’ in order to achieve political change. In no 
case in the data-set were arguments made in favour of political or personal contact 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 
Preliminary Note on the Concept of ‘Kufr’ 
Before examining the extracts, the concepts of ‘kufr’ and ‘shirk’ need to be described. 
The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam defines al-Kufr as ‘Unbelief in God, the state of 
being an infidel, blasphemy’ (Glassé, 1989, p241). Watt (1964) describes the concept 
as ‘that which characterizes non-Muslims or rather opponents of the Islamic 
community, and also that which changes a Muslim into an opponent of the 
community. Any article of belief or any activity which was felt to indicate that a man 
had broken away from the Islamic community would be an instance of kufr’ (p11). 
Watt goes on to write that a ‘man ceases to be a member if he does something which 
the general body of Muslims feel to be incompatible with membership. Usually this 
will be something which aligns him with a rival community” (p12). The concept of 
‘kufr’, then, is ideal in arguments about identity and who should represent the group – 
to accuse another party of kufr is a discursive move to declare them no longer a group 
member and therefore to deny their right to speak from the same identity position. 
This is made explicit by commentator A, who takes issue with prominent Muslims in 
the MCB who suggested that French Muslims should obey a recent law to ban the 
wearing of the hijab in schools: 
There is no such principle within Islam that says you have to obey any laws other 
than what Allah (SWT2) has revealed. (..)3 To legitimise obedience to anyone or 
anything else, other than Allah (SWT), is a clear act of major Shirk (polytheism) and 
Kufr (disbelief) which takes one out of the fold of Islam. (Extract 1: A 28/6)4 
 
The same root is found in the word ‘kuffar’ (‘kafir’), which describes a group of 
people. A kafir is ‘one who refuses to see the truth, an infidel’ (Glassé, 1989, p216). 
                                                 
2 SWT is short for ‘Subhanahu wata’ala’ (glorified and exalted). This is often inserted after the name of 
Allah in Islamic texts. 
3 (..) indicates omitted text. 
4 Throughout the analysis, each quote is coded with the date of the email and its author. 
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The act of declaring a Muslim to be a kuffar is ‘takfir/takfeer’, while the behaviour 
which causes a person to be declared kuffar is called the ‘mukaffir’. The concept of 
shirk is used in a similar way. ‘Shirk’ is the sin of associating something with God 
(idolatory). Like the concept of ‘kufr’, the root of ‘shirk’ also describes an outgroup: 
“The sin of shirk (“association”) is a name for paganism: pagans are called ‘the 
associators’ (mushrikun)” (Glassé, 1989, p370). When these terms can legitimately be 
used is a controversial matter, and is the subject of debate among Muslim scholars and 
commentators.  
The notion of ‘kufr’ is used extensively in the emails to describe the UK 
political system and Western society. It is an essentialist and homogenising label used 
to group non-Muslims into the same moral, political and cultural system, defined by 
its essential ‘kufr’ nature. Kufr is everything which is not Islam, and kuffar are 
everyone who are not Muslims – it is a powerful and concise way of saying ‘not us’. 
It is also of central importance to the distinction between ‘dar al-Islam’ (the land of 
Islam) and ‘dar al-kufr/harb’ (the land of non-believers/war) which is part of the 
debates over ‘da’wah’ between UK Muslims described by Kahani-Hopkins and 
Hopkins (2002). Da’wah is the ‘call’ to Islam, and is interpreted in a variety of ways 
by different movements and traditions (Esposito, 2003). Some see da’wah as calling 
believers back to an earlier, purer version of Islam and rejecting influence by the 
secular West while others concentrate on the mission to bring non-believers to the 
faith. Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins (2002) describe how different organisations in the 
UK characterize it as either requiring separate political organisation outside the 
secular system (e.g. the Muslim Parliament) or as requiring engagement in Western 
political systems since this would promote respect for Islamic values (e.g. the Islamic 
Party of Great Britain). 
The analysis is split into two sections. The first describes the main arguments in 
favour of the prescriptive norm that Muslims should not join, support, or be 
influenced by non-Muslims in a range of political matters.  The second considers how 
‘moderates’ (those who break this norm) are denounced and constructed as deviants. 
The split is made here for the purposes of clarity, however the construction of 
deviance is part of the construction of norms and they often occur within the same 
account. Because the main focus is the practice of denunciation, more detailed 
analysis will be presented in the second section. 
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Prescriptive Norms: Reasons for Avoiding Political Contact 
Several arguments are advanced to explain why Muslims should not engage with 
secular systems or cooperate politically with non-Muslims. These are separated into 
three broad themes: religious injunctions, Western opposition to Islamic values, and 
the threat from the West.  
 
1) Religious injunctions. A variety of arguments, often using Quranic verses as 
evidence, declare that Muslims are prohibited by Islam from participating in secular 
systems, taking ‘kafirs’ as friends, or supporting ‘kuffar’ who are fighting against 
other Muslims. References to such verses are a common feature of Al Qaeda treatises 
and supportive web-sites, in which they are used to denounce other Muslims as 
apostates (Musawi, 2010; see for example Al-Zawahiri, 2002). It should be noted, 
however, that there are many Islamic scholars and theologians who reject these 
interpretations, arguing that the verses are taken out of context, the translations from 
Arabic are not straightforward, and that their use to justify separation or hostility 
ignores the many verses in the Quran promoting peace and tolerance (e.g., Shaltut 
1940; Dakake 2006, Laher 2006; Al-Akiti 2005; Seedat, 2006; Yildiz & Verkuyten, 
2012). 
As an example of the use of Quranic verses, in one email commentator B cites 
nine verses from the Quran warning against alliance with ‘kafirs’. This includes:  
Allah says about Kafirs such as Galloway who are in the business of peddling Kufr, 
Surah III Family of Imran O you who believe! Take not for intimates other than your 
own folk, who would spare no pains to ruin you; they (Kafirs) love to hamper you. 
Hatred is revealed by the utterances of their mouths, but that which their breasts hide 
is greater. (v118) 
 
B concludes:  
Just that small selection of verses from Allah’s message tells us that in the area of 
politics we cannot ally ourselves with Kafirs. (Extract 2: B 17/4) 
 
In other cases, religious injunctions come from the writings or fatwas of Islamic 
scholars and ideologues. According to these, the secular and ‘kufr’ nature of the 
political system itself is also a problem (see Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004b; 
Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002 for further use of this notion in debates among UK 
Muslims; see also Musawi, 2010, on the concept of ‘taghut’ in ‘Salafi-Jihadism’). In 
an email arguing that Muslims should not support Galloway, B writes that: 
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Sheikh Qutb, by redefining Jahiliyya to cover secular systems of political 
organization, said that all existing systems are unacceptable and against the spirit of 
Islam.(..) Any system of rule that is not based on Allah’s supreme and sole right as a 
legislative source, is Shirk. (Extract 3: B 24/4) 
 
On 1/5, an email was sent containing a fatwa on voting. Although this was written to 
cover participation in US elections, it was sent around the PIR mailing list at the time 
of the UK general election in 2005 (see Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004b and 
Hopkins et al, 2003 for this debate in the context of the 1997 UK election). In a 
similar way to the quote above, participation is rejected because secular systems are 
not based on the laws of Allah. The fatwa declares: 
What we believe and take as a religion  is that participating in the legislative 
assemblies is Kufr, and Shirk in Allah (..) this is because these assemblies give the 
right of legislating unlimitedly to humans, and not their Lord, and the evidences that 
such an action is from the clear Mukaffirat (actions causing disbelief) and nullifiers of 
Islam, are many (..)  there are several inescapable causes of Takfir (..) the most 
dangerous of these is accepting the right that the constitution bestows upon the 
member, to legislate limitlessly, and to abide by that, and this is clear-cut Kufr. 
(Extract 4: Fatwa signed by list of scholars 1/5) 
 
This leads to the argument, in some mailings, that Muslims must organize within their 
own community. For example, C (17/8) asserts that Muslims have a distinct role 
which can only be played if ‘we are independent of the secular empire and not a 
branch of it’. 
 
2) Western opposition to core Islamic values. Here it is argued that Muslims 
should not cooperate because the ‘kuffar’ oppose Islamic values (and therefore Islam). 
Evidence is provided by politicians’ opposition to certain positions which the 
commentators claim represent the true spirit of Islam. These include support for 
Shariah, the Muslim Brotherhood, the mujahideen, Sayid Qutb and Al Qaeda, and 
rejection of secular nationalism. For example, commentator B (11/4) argues that 
Muslims should not be loyal to ‘Kafir’ political parties because: ‘All the Kafir 
political parties are peddling the same kuffar excrement because they oppose the 
Shariah of Allah.’ Not only does this essentialise the political parties (as essentially 
‘kafir’) but it also presents a strong extreme case that they are ‘all’ the same. This 
flexibility of the ‘kufr’ root means that it can be applied to a group, a system, or any 
other thing seen to be un-Islamic. The use of the term ‘kuffar excrement’ implies the 
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ideology to be disgusting, a theme linked to notions of contagion that we will see 
later.  
In attacks on George Galloway, his support for ‘apostate Arab rulers like Nasser 
and Arafat’ and his criticism of Bin Laden proves he is against Islam since ‘the 
ideology behind the mujahideen group, Al Qaeda, is Islam (..) Their statements are 
always backed by references to the Qur’aan and Hadeeth.’  Galloway’s criticism 
therefore ‘confirms his hatred of Islam as a bona fide Kafir’. (B:17/4) 
 
3) Threat. Non-Muslims are described as having a variety of malign motives 
regarding Islam and Muslims (see also Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004a; 2006; 
Leudar et al, 2004; for this theme in relation to Iraq see Hafez, 2007). In this respect, 
the discourse is a mirror opposite of the discourse of far right parties in Europe which 
portray Islam as a threat European culture (e.g. Verkuyten, 2011; Wood & Finlay, 
2008). Throughout the mailings Muslims are described as under attack. There are 
regular references to Muslim deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and 
Palestine, abuses of human rights in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, UK 
government anti-terrorism actions seen to be targeting Muslims, and historical 
examples such as the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition. Those who ally with 
Western powers are accused of sharing responsibility for attacks on Muslims. For 
example, commentator A (12/5) criticizes the regimes of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan for not providing security for the ‘Muslim Ummah’. The writer states 
that the Quran prohibits ‘aligning with belligerent infidels to fight fellow muslims.’ 
Of Muslims who voted for pro-war parties in the UK elections, ‘They are in fact 
worshipping over the graves of the Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan for which they 
have become complicit.’  
A related argument that runs through many emails is that the UK is racist and 
Islamaphobic: Muslims are structurally disadvantaged in society and victimised by the 
security services. For example, B (2/9) argues ‘British Muslims are disadvantaged and 
discriminated against. They are the last to get hired and the first to get fired.’ 
In an echo of an argument in an Al Qaeda treatise on Loyalty and Enmity (Al 
Zawahiri, 2002), it is also argued that non-Muslims want Muslims to turn away from 
Islam (see also Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004a). The following quote begins with 
an injunction from the Quran, then follows with a warning that George Galloway 
 15 
wants Muslims to reject Allah. The category ‘kuffar’ is again used to suggest that all 
political parties, and the United Nations, have the same basic orientation and aim. 
Allah told the Muslims in the Qur’aan not to take Kafirs for confidantes.(..) No matter 
what happens, Galloway and his sort are part and parcel of the Kuffar establishment. 
They want to play the game by the system, which the Kuffar invented. (..) The 
socialists like the rest of the Kuffar system want to handicap the Ummah into begging 
for mercy to the United Kuffar Nations and the other Kuffar institutions because the 
aim is to propagate disbelief (kufr) and turn Muslims away from Allah and his 
Messenger. (Extract 5: B 11/4) 
 
Commentators also argue that western powers want to create their own version of 
Islam in order to better control it. For example, C (17/8) argues that ‘States 
throughout Europe (..) are now creating Establishment Muslim bodies, to shape a 
deviant Islam in the image of the West.’ A month later, the same commentator, in an 
email on the Task Force on Preventing Islamic Extremism, links this to the secularism 
of the Church of England:  
the Government’s agenda is to reform Islam and Muslims instead of reforming their 
own foreign policies and support for the State of Israel. (..) The control of Islam in 
Britain will be further handed to the British government thus paving the way for the 
development of an Islam in the model of the Church of England, one that is secular in 
nature and subservient to the State. (Extract 6: C 26/9) 
 
The history of the British Empire is also put forward as evidence that working with 
the British establishment is dangerous. Below it is suggested Muslims are fooled into 
believing they are helping their communities, while in reality they are being 
manipulated:  
Dear Muslim Brothers and Sisters! Be warned of one thing. People over the centuries 
have slipped into a dangerous relationships with the enemies of Islam, often thinking 
they were helping their communities. The history of the British Empire and post 
Empire shows us that they are past masters of such manipulation. (Extract 7: Anon 
14/6) 
 
In mailings by commentator B, references to contagion and infection are often used to 
imply contact is dangerous. For example, an attack on Galloway states: 
I personally don’t think it’s hygienic for Believers to allow the dirty Marxist Kafir 
within 5m of them without taking vaccines against venereal diseases. (..) I ask sincere 
believers to bring their community back to Allah by keeping this Marxist Kafir and 
his filthy party out of Muslim areas for environmental health reasons at the very least! 
(Extract 8: B 24/4)  
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The notion of contagion is also linked to cultural tropes implying subservience 
(described below). In the following quote, the MCB, by cooperating with the 
taskforce on extremism, endanger other Muslims:  
Obviously other Muslims are not safe from the tongues of the MCB, and I don’t mean 
because they are infected with Blair’s backside bacteria, but because the MCB also 
use their tongues to make Muslims unsafe from the attention of Blair the war criminal 
Kuffar. Which means the MCB is a Kaafir organisation. (Extract 9: B 4/8) 
 
To summarize, the emails construct a prescriptive group norm whereby avoidance of 
political contact and cooperation with non-Muslims is consonant with authentic 
Muslim values and interests. This then allows those Muslims who break this norm by 
engaging with Western politics and secular institutions to be discounted as deviant 
and disloyal. The next section illustrates how these ‘moderate’ Muslims are 
denounced in ways that both explain their behaviour in derogatory terms, and 
categorize them in such a way as to deny their claim to represent Muslims. 
 
Denunciation and Derogation: The Construction of Deviants 
A great variety of derogatory names and concepts are used to denounce Muslims in 
the UK who are seen as being too close to non-Muslims. These are divided into 
themes of apostasy/losing one’s Muslim identity, subservience, and self-interest and 
ignorance. These accounts and descriptions explain the behaviour of targets as based 
on weakness, ignorance, character flaws or religious deviation rather than due to 
considered political beliefs or alternative theological interpretation.  
 
a) Apostasy/rejecting one’s Muslim identity. Previous research has shown 
how both those who reject Al Qaeda (e.g. Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2012), and those who 
support Al Qaeda (e.g. Leudar et al, 2004), construct versions of Muslims that place 
opponents outside the group. Apostasy (and kufr) is a strong accusation as it places 
the person outside the Muslim community (and thus outside the social identity). The 
notion of kufr is frequently used in emails which denounce Muslims as apostates for 
supporting governments at war with Muslims. For example, D (8/8) draws on similar 
Quranic injuctions to those seen above when declaring that:  
Allah tells us that Muslims must not make of the Kuffars his allies behind other 
Muslims’ backs. (..) This means that no Muslim is authorised to help those who 
invaded Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Palestine or repress honest Muslims. (..) To 




In another email, the MCB are described as ‘munafiq’. This term describes a religious 
‘hypocrite’, a person who may seem to practice Islam but inside is a disbeliever. The 
context here is that an alleged leaked email suggested the MCB should write sermons 
for UK imams. The email refers to the MCB as ‘a.k.a. the Munafiq Council of Britain’ 
and describes it as ‘favoured by the British government and its intelligence services’. 
(17/6 Petition Call) 
The image of a Muslim joining the ‘kuffar’ is also seen in commentator A’s 
criticism of particular MCB members:  
Some senior MCB member or like-minded supporter is reported to have 
affectionately called those British soldiers murdering Iraqis as: ‘our boys’. Yes that 
provoked my imagination of the Lords and Knights of the MCB exiting the Mosque 
and then entering the Pub (Bar), celebrating the ‘victory’ over a pint with the lads 
(‘our boys’) and collectively singing some song about paki-bashing! (Extract 11: A 
28/6) 
 
Here the image of Muslims joining the ‘Kuffar’ is even more explicit. The MCB 
member is imagined joining in cultural practices associated with secular culture and 
which go against Islam. Joining ‘the lads’ in the pub breaks the Islamic proscription 
on alcohol, while the ‘paki-bashing’ song reminds the reader of the street violence 
towards Muslim immigrants that was carried out in recent decades by some sections 
of the white community. The same email discusses Inayat Bunglawala’s (member of 
the MCB and chair of a government taskforce on extremism) alleged statement that 
Muslims could fight in the British forces and advises other Muslims to shun him. In 
this extract we see Bunglawala’s manhood questioned with the use of quotation marks 
around ‘man/he/him’. The charge of apostasy is again justified with references to the 
Quran: 
Numerous verses in the Quran have clearly stated that the believers are prohibited 
from allying with the non-Muslims and most definitely if the alliance is against 
fellow Muslims (..) I would sincerely advise everyone to treat this ‘man’ as if ‘he’ is a 
belligerent apostate! I would not pray behind ‘him’ nor would I permit any Muslim 
female to marry him. (..) I would strongly advise his wife to leave the joint home 
because apostasy annuls marriage automatically. (Extract 12: A 28/6) 
 
As we will see below, historical precedent is regularly drawn on in these 
denunciations. For example, references are frequently made to crusades and crusaders, 
a common feature of Al Qaeda discourse (see Ibrahim, 2007). Commentator E (28/6) 
discusses Iqbal Sacranie’s (leader of the MCB) acceptance of a knighthood, which is 
 18 
described as ‘an award which was to honour crusaders … you know the knights of 
Britain who wreaked havoc in the Holy Lands causing rivers of the blood of innocent 
Muslims to flow knee-deep through Jerusalem?’ Here, the acceptance of the award 
means Sacranie has joined the aggressors against Muslims: ‘a man who claims to 
represent the face of ordinary British Muslims is to become a Crusader.’  
The charge of apostasy and/or joining the ‘kuffar’ is a categorical judgement in 
these extracts rather than an explanatory account: it is an assertion that the target is no 
longer a category member, and thus has no speaking position as a Muslim.  
 
b) Subservience. The second category of dishonour describes Muslims as being 
subservient to non-Muslims, suggesting a weakness of character in the targets. Rather 
than drawing on theological arguments, these accounts draw instead on post-colonial, 
psychological and gender discourses, and in doing so combine explanations with 
identity constructions. General terms such as ‘stooges’ and ‘sell-outs’ are often used 
along with dehumanising references to trained animals. For example, B (6/8) 
describes the MCB as the “Kuffar’s stooges”. In other emails, B refers to ‘compliant 
eunochs’, ‘sidekicks from the British Muslim community’ (17/4), ‘bootlickers’ (2/9) 
and ‘trained monkeys’ (4/8), while commentator E (28/6) writes ‘Iqbal Sacranie has 
been a willing lapdog of British Prime Minister Tony Blair.’  
These Muslims are sometimes accused of feeling inferior and seeking validation 
from non-Muslims. In the quote below, Muslims are removed from the category of 
men rather than the category of Muslims. Thus B (11/4) emasculates those who 
support Galloway as they become ‘the eunochs of the Ummah who have consistently 
denounced the Mujahideen and other activists as ‘extremists’ and are happy to sniff 
around a Kaffir’s rear end to get validation from a white Kafir.’ Metaphors of 
emasculation and backside-licking (or ‘ass-kissing’) are often used by B in particular. 
In a mailing on 4/8, B refers to the MCB as ‘the brown-tongues-in-chief’ and suggest 
the government create a new award ‘Knight of the Order of the Brown Tongues’. 
The notion of an inferiority complex is used to denounce moderates. In a similar 
way to ideas of Jewish self-hatred (Lewin, 1941; Finlay, 2005) it is suggested that 
domination by the British (historically and through being in a minority in Britain) has 
led to a pathology of identity – the targets are ‘mentally colonised’ or suffer from an 
‘inferiority complex’, causing them to revere and bow before non-Muslims, and 
ultimately betray their roots: 
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they suffer from insecurity, inferiority complex and are desperate to be accepted by 
their new communities, thus they have turned their back on their roots, foul mouthed 
their ancestry, rubbish their native values and vilify Islam. (Extract 13: A 14/9) 
 
Commentator B offers a similar account in a discussion of why Muslims might 
support Galloway:  
He’s figured that the British Muslims are so mentally colonised from the days of the 
old British Empire that if they see a white man showing sympathy for them then 
they’ll be flocking to him. (Extract 14: B 24/4) 
 
In this extract we see history again used as a resource for derogation. History (and 
‘serial connectedness’ – Condor, 1996) is an important feature in debates about 
identity and political action (Condor, 2006; Lyons, 1996; for examples in Muslim 
politics see Hopkins et al, 2003; McKinlay, McVittie & Sambaraju, 2011). In the PIR 
mailings the history of colonial rule in India, the Crusades, and the Inquisition were 
frequently used to denounce opponents. Thus B discusses Islamophobia in the UK, 
and links this to colonial rule in India: 
The wholesale betrayal of the UK Muslim population by the Establishment should 
have been enough to get Muslims on the warpath; never mind the Crusade against 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This lack of backbone is consistent with the attitude from back 
in the days British colonial rule in India. (Extract 15: B 2/9) 
 
Comparisons are frequently made to historic groups such as ‘coolies’ and ‘muddajjin’. 
Commentator C (17/8), discussing Muslims who report on others thought to be 
extremists, argues that:  
These groups of Muslims aligned with the authorities existed under the Inquisition 
too, they were known as Muddajjin by the Muslims (domesticated, tamed, in total 
darkness). Such Muslims foolishly believed that by collaborating with the State they 
could save themselves. (Extract 16: C 17/8) 
 
c) Self-interest and ignorance. The final set of accounts suggest Muslims who 
engage in political contact are motivated for personal status, favour, or grant money, 
and/or have a limited understanding of the nature of non-Muslims. Again, the identity 
constructions involve explanatory accounts for their positions, in this case greed or 
naivety. Commentator A explains that Muslims who voted for pro-war politicians did 
so  
because they get their grant money to build plush Mosques and schools. (Extract 18: 
A 12/5) 
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History is also drawn on when talking about self-interest. Commentator A uses 
the term ‘coolies’ to describe those Muslims who participated in UK government 
moves to deport extremists during 2005: 
The self-serving individuals in our midst are like the coolies that served your 
forefathers in the British Raj. They argue in collusion with some of the Muslim 
moderates in favour of deportation, desperately trying to preserve their self-interest. 
(Extract 19: A 26/8) 
 
Commentator C lists the following reasons why Muslims might engage with the 
government. The writer describes Muslims participating in a government taskforce on 
extremism as ‘Opportunist Muslim Parliamentarians’ who: 
use the task force to promote themselves as Blair loyalists, hence working their way 
up the ladder at the expense of British Muslims. There will be plenty of work for 
consultants and Muslims seeking to establish their careers, and places on ‘influential’ 
committees. (Extract 20: C 26/8) 
 
Discussion 
To understand group conflict in the real world we must understand how support for 
conflict is constructed as normative, and how those who are not seen as sufficiently 
hostile are constructed as disloyal and deviant. This is part of the persuasive discourse 
of militant groups. In situations of political turmoil there are disputes over what the 
correct norms are regarding the outgroup as well as who can be labelled 
disloyal/deviant. Group members argue that their versions are the truth, and their 
internal opponents’ versions are corrupted. The practice of denunciation illustrates 
how this is done. In a similar way to Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2006), the first 
section of the analysis has shown how norms against political participation and 
cooperation are constructed as natural and correct through essentialist assertions about 
the teachings of Islam and particular versions of the intergroup context in which the 
West is threatening Muslims. The analysis then goes further, showing (in the second 
section) how this relates to constructions of opponents as deviant using theological, 
post-colonial and psychological discourses. These denunciations position their targets 
as both outside the group and suffering from a range of pathological complexes and 
character weaknesses.  
As with Garfinkel’s (1956) description of ‘status degradation ceremonies’, 
accounts of the reasons or motives for the other’s behaviour are a crucial feature of 
the denunciations seen here. By using explanations based on character failings, there 
is no need to examine the possible logical, theological or political analyses behind an 
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opponent’s position, and the reaction is one of moral indignation or disgust rather than 
debate. Orcutt (1973) suggests that when deviance is attributed to character failings 
(rather than situational pressures), the reaction of other group members is more likely 
to be exclusionary – isolating and excluding the individual from the group (see also 
Levine & Kerr, 2007; Levine & Moreland, 2002). 
Although each situation of violent conflict has its own particular cultural and 
historical context, militants face a common problem in dealing with fellow group-
members who disagree. A response found in a number of situations is to delegitimize 
this section of the community using a variety of denunciations and derogations 
(Finlay, 2005; 2007). These social practices are part of explicit attempts at social 
influence and the regulation of the group. Public demonization is a warning to others 
as to how they might be branded should they adopt a similar position, and it is 
relevant that some of the slurs in the data presented in the second section seem 
directed particularly at the sensitivities of young men, in particular at their bravery 
(e.g. ‘lack of backbone’), integrity (e.g. ‘bootlickers’), loyalty (e.g. ‘they have .. foul-
mouthed their ancestry’) and masculinity (e.g. ‘compliant eunochs’). For those 
members who are undecided about their position, it gives emotive reasons not to be a 
moderate - they would become ‘brown tongues’, their masculinity would be 
questioned, they would be labelled mentally and morally weak, they would become 
apostates. This is also reflected in research into Al Qaeda communications, which 
separate, for example, pious youth from those susceptible to western influence, and 
‘islam’ from ‘kufr’ (Cheong & Halverson, 2010). In a recent report, Musawi (2010) 
discusses how ‘Salafist-Jihadist’ web-sites devote a good deal of space to attacking 
those they perceive to be ‘internal enemies’. The issue of moderate Muslims has also 
been a subject discussed by Al Qaeda leaders. For example, Al Qaeda  issued an essay 
entitled “Moderate Islam is a prostration to the West” which appeared on many web-
sites (translated in Ibrahim, 2007), and Ayman Al-Zawahiri (2002) wrote a whole 
treatise on the subject of ‘Wala/Bara’ (Loyalty and Enmity).  
There are similarities between the arguments used here to discount internal 
opponents and those described in other studies of political rhetoric. Politicians often 
claim that they represent the majority while their opponents are disconnected from the 
people or represent a minority or politically elite grouping (e.g. Rapley, 1998; Reicher 
& Hopkins; 1996, 1998; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011; Stevenson et al, 2007). The 
notion of mental colonisation (or internalized oppression) seen in the section on 
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subservience is used in hawkish Zionist discourse to discount the peace movement in 
Israel as ‘self-hating’ (Finlay, 2005), the notion of weakness or cowardice is used by 
far-right politicians to discount mainstream politicians (Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 
2011; Wood & Finlay, 2008), and notions of bribery, personal reward and ignorance 
(seen in the section on self-interest) are found in fascist rhetoric to delegitimize 
members of the ingroup who oppose racism and anti-semitism (Finlay, 2007; Wood & 
Finlay, 2008). These types of accounts fall into the category of the ‘psychologization’ 
of opponents (Papastamou, 1986). Historical studies show similar strategies, where 
American and French revolutionaries tended to understand opposition in terms of 
greed, selfishness and corruption (e.g. Ducharme & Fine, 1995; Lucas, 1996).  
In the communications analysed above, historical comparisons relating to the 
history of Muslims and colonialism are drawn on in both the construction of norms 
and deviance. This temporal aspect is important to acknowledge (see Condor, 1996, 
2006, for discussions of this issue) since the emails construct a version of the world 
where the West is historically attacking Muslims, and where current Muslims 
engaging in political contact are just the most recent examples of an historically-
enduring category of apostates or subservient Muslims. Similar discursive themes can 
be seen in other historical contexts and other Islamic political movements, from the 
ideology of the Kharijites of the seventh century, through to the anti-colonial 
revivalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Esposito, 1991). 
These movements also argued for an Islamic system devoid of western influence and 
rallied against the leaders of many Muslim countries seen as too westernized. 
To conclude, in conflict situations members who engage positively with 
outgroups pose a threat to other group members who argue for separation and/or 
hostility. In such cases, norms of intergroup contact are disputed within the group. If 
norms are disputed, so are constructions of prototypicality and deviance, and it is the 
job of those who wish to lead the group to try and get their versions accepted. In this 
paper we have seen in some detail how a group advocating militancy use the practice 
of denunciation to present disengagement as normative, and those engaging in 
cooperative contact as deviant. This illustrates one way in which intra-group practices 
of social influence are an important aspect of intergroup conflict. Finally, our 
understanding of norms and deviance need to recognize that these constructs might 
not be consensual, but are often constructed in political arguments to align with 
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